This paper studies comparative risk aversion between risk averse agents in the presence of a background risk. Although the literature covers this question extensively, our contribution differs from most of the literature in two respects. First, background risk does not need to be additive or multiplicative. Second, the two risks are not necessary mean independent, and may be quadrant dependent. We show that our order of cross Ross risk aversion is equivalent to that of partial risk premium, while our index of decreasing cross Ross risk aversion is equivalent to that of a decreasing partial risk premium. These results generalize the comparative risk aversion model developed by Ross (1981) for mean independent risks. Finally, we show that decreasing cross Ross risk aversion gives rise to the utility function family belonging to the class of n-switch utility functions.
1 Introduction Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) propose an important theorem stating that risk aversion comparisons using risk premia and measures of risk aversion always give the same result. Ross (1981) shows that when an agent faces more than one risk, Arrow-Pratt measures are not strong enough to support the plausible association between absolute risk aversion and the size of the risk premium. He proposes a stronger ordering called Ross risk aversion. Several studies extend Ross' results. Most papers generalize them to higher-orders of risk aversion for univariate utility functions (see Modica and Scarsini, 2005; Jindapon and Neilson, 2007; Li, 2009; Denuit and Eeckhoudt, 2010a) . This paper provides another direction to this line of research.
There is growing concern about risk attitudes of bivariate utility function in the literature (see Courbage, 2001; Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Eeckhoudt et al., 2007; Courbage and Rey, 2007; Menegatti, 2009 a,b; Denuit and Eeckhoudt, 2010b; Li, 2011; Denuit et al., 2011a) . To our knowledge, these studies do not analyze comparative risk aversion. The …rst paper that looks at preservation of "more risk averse" with general multivariate preferences and background risk is Nachman (1982) . However, in his setting the background risk is independent. Pratt (1988) also considers the comparison of risk aversion both with and without the presence of an independent background risk using a two-argument utility function. This paper examines comparative Ross risk aversion in the setting of a positive quadrant dependent (PQD, or negative quadrant dependent, NQD) background risk 1 . First, we extend Finkelshtain et al.'s (1999) research by analyzing comparative risk aversion in a slightly di¤erent context. Then we introduce the notion of cross Ross risk aversion and show that more cross Ross risk aversion is associated with a higher partial risk premium in the presence of a PQD (or NQD) background risk. Hence, we demonstrate that the index of cross Ross risk aversion is equivalent to the order of partial risk premium. We also propose the concept of decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for obtaining an equivalence between decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and decreasing partial risk premium for a PQD (or NQD) background risk. We apply this result to examine the e¤ects of changes in wealth and …nancial background risk on the intensity of risk aversion. Finally, we show that speci…c 1 The concept of quadrant dependence was introduced by Lehmann (1966) . Portfolio selection problems with quadrant dependence have been explored by Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) and Dachraoui and Dionne (2007) , among others.
assumptions about the behavior of the decreasing cross Ross risk aversion gives rise to the utility function form that belongs to the class of n-switch utility functions (Abbas and Bell, 2011) .
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some concepts of dependence.
In Section 3, we consider necessary and su¢ cient conditions for risk aversion to one risk in the presence of a PQD (or NQD) background risk. Section 4 o¤ers the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for comparing two agents' attitudes towards risk with di¤erent utility functions.
Section 5 considers the same agent's attitude at di¤erent wealth levels under a PQD (or NQD) background risk. Section 6 applies our results to …nancial background risks. Section 7 relates decreasing cross Ross risk aversion to the n-switch independence property. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Review of some concepts of dependence
Let F (x; y) denote the joint distribution and F X (x) and F Y (y) the marginal distribution ofx andỹ. Ross (1981) consider the following relationship betweenx andỹ.
De…nition 2.1 (Ross, 1981) 
Mean independence is a stronger restriction than uncorrelatedness. However, it is weaker than independence. Lehmann (1966) introduced the following general concept to investigate positive dependence. De…nition 2.2 (Lehmann, 1966 ) (x;ỹ) is positively quadrant dependent, written P QD(x;ỹ), if
f or all x; y:
(1) can be rewritten as
x andỹ are negative quadrant dependent, written N QD(x;ỹ), if the above inequalities hold with the inequality sign reversed. Lehmann interpreted (1) as follows: "knowledge ofỹ being small increases the probability ofx being small". In the economic literature (see for example Gollier, 2007) , positive (or negative) quadrant dependence is related to …rst-order stochastic dominance:
F X (x) …rst-order dominates (or is dominated by) F X (xjỹ y) under PQD(x;ỹ) (N QD(x;ỹ)). Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) assert that a large subset of the multivariate elliptical distribution class is PQD. For more examples, see Joe (1997) .
We now propose relationships between the three following de…nitions: Finkelshtain et al., 1999) and P QD(x;ỹ).
Proof See the Appendix.
Risk aversion with two risks
We consider an economic agent whose preference for wealth,w, and a variable,ỹ, can be represented by a bivariate model of expected utility. We let u(w; y) denote the utility function, and let u 1 (w; y) denote @u @w and u 2 (w; y) denote @u @y , and follow the same subscript convention for the functions u 11 (w; y) and u 12 (w; y) and so on, and assume that the partial derivatives required for any above de…nition all exist and are continuous.
Let us consider the following de…nition of risk aversion proposed by Finkelshtain et al. (1999) .
De…nition 3.1 (Finkelshtain, Kella and Scarsini, 1999) An agent is risk averse in zero-mean riskx with (x;ỹ) if Eu(w +x;ỹ) Eu(w + Ex;ỹ)
for all initial wealth w. Finkelshtain et al. (1999) provide the following necessary and su¢ cient condition on u for obtaining risk aversion to one risk in the presence of a background risk.
Proposition 3.2 (Finkelshtain, Kella and Scarsini, 1999) The following statements are equivalent:
(i) For 8w and every zero-mean riskx such that E[ỹjx = x] is non-decreasing in x, inequality (4) holds;
(ii) u is submodular (i.e., u(x _ y) + u(x^y) u(x) + u(y) for all x; y 2 R 2 ) and concave in its …rst argument.
We now propose an alternative condition on u to obtain risk aversion in the presence of P QD(x;ỹ):
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) For 8w and everyx with P QD(x;ỹ), inequality (4) holds;
(ii) u 11 0 and u 12 0.
The interpretation of the sign of the u 12 goes back to De Finetti (1952) and has been studied and extended by Epstein and Tanny (1980) ; Richard (1975) ; Scarsini (1988) and Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) . For example, Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) show that u 12 0 is necessary and su¢ cient for an agent to be "correlation averse," meaning that a higher level of the second argument mitigates the detrimental e¤ect of a reduction in the …rst argument. Agents are correlation averse if they always prefer a 50-50 gamble of a loss in x or a loss in y over another 50-50 gamble o¤ering a loss in both x and y. Proposition 3.3 shows that an agent with both risk aversion (concavity) in its …rst argument and correlation aversion dislikes a risk in the presence of a PQD background risk. We want to quantify this e¤ect. This can be done by evaluating the maximum amount of money that this agent is ready to pay to escape one component of the bivariate risk in the presence of the other. Chalfant and Finkelshtain (1993) introduced the following idea into the economics literature.
De…nition 3.4 (Chalfant and Finkelshtain, (1993) ) For u and v, the partial risk premia u and v inx for (x;ỹ) is de…ned as
and Ev(w +x;ỹ) = Ev(w v + Ex;ỹ):
From Proposition 3.3 we know that u 11 0 and u 12 0 (v 11 0 and v 12 0) if and only if u 0 ( v 0) for any riskx with PQD(x;ỹ).
4
The partial risk premia u and v are the maximal monetary amounts individuals u and v are willing to pay for removing one risk in the presence of a second risk. We derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for comparative partial risk premia in the presence of PQD background risk. Extension of the analysis to NQD background risk is discussed later. Let us introduce two de…nitions of comparative risk aversion motivated by Ross (1981) . The following de…nition uses u 12 (w;y) u 1 (w;y) and v 12 (w;y) v 1 (w;y) as local measures of correlation aversion. De…nition u is more cross Ross risk averse than v if and only if there exists 1 ; 2 > 0 such that for all w; y and y 0 u 12 (w; y) v 12 (w; y)
and
When u(w; y) = U (w + y) in (7) and (8), we obtain the de…nition of comparative Ross risk aversion for mean independent risks. However, we are interested in comparisons when the agents face two dependent risks which is more general than mean independence. The following proposition provides an equivalent comparison between risk aversion and partial risk premium in the presence of PQD background risks.
Proposition 4.1 For u, v with u 1 > 0, v 1 > 0, v 11 < 0, u 11 < 0, u 12 < 0 and v 12 < 0, the following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) u is more cross Ross risk averse than v.
(ii) There exists : R R ! R with 1 0, 12 0 and 11 0, and > 0 such that
(iii) u v for 8 w andx with P QD(x;ỹ).
When an agent faces a PQD background risk, the cross Ross risk aversion de…nition establishes an unambiguous relation between more risk version and a higher willingness to pay for insurance. Hence, the cross Ross measure of absolute risk aversion is in line with our intuition in this partial insurance economic problem. Bacause, as mentioned in the preceding section,
as the local measure of correlation aversion. 
It is easy to demonstrate the following proposition in that context:
Conjecture 4.2 For u, v with u 1 > 0, v 1 > 0, v 11 < 0 and u 11 < 0, the following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists > 0 such that for all (w; y):
v 1 (w;y 0 ) ; (ii) There exists > 0 and : R R ! R with 1 0 and 11 0 such that u = v + ;
In other words, Ross' result is easily extended to the bivariate case. Observe that in this conjecture, we do not need to know anything about cross-derivatives. This means that crossderivatives are useful only to take PQD into account. This could be made clearer with the following polar conjecture: Proposition 4.1 in this paper combines these two conjectures in a single proposition by linking PQD to the sign of the cross-derivative of .
Decreasing cross Ross risk aversion with respect to wealth
In this section, we examine how the partial risk premium for a given riskx is a¤ected by a change in initial wealth w, in the presence of a PQD background risk. Fully di¤erentiating equation (5) with respect to w yields 2
hence,
Thus, the partial risk premium is decreasing in wealth if and only if
where h u 1 is de…ned as minus the partial derivative of function u. Because h 1 = u 11 0, condition (11) simply states that the partial risk premium of agent h is larger than the partial risk premium of agent u. From Proposition 4.1, this is true if and only if h is more cross Ross risk averse than u. That is, 9 1 ; 2 > 0, for all w,y and y 0 , such that
or, equivalently, u 112 (w; y) u 12 (w; y)
and u 111 (w; y) u 11 (w; y)
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1 For u with u 1 > 0, u 11 < 0, u 12 < 0, u 111 0 and u 112 0, the following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) the partial risk premium u ; associated with any P QD(x;ỹ) is decreasing in wealth;
(iii) 9 1 ; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y 0 , such that
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is obtained by using (9) to (15).
Proposition 5.1 introduces u 112 (w;y) u 11 (w;y) and u 111 (w;y) u 11 (w;y) as local measurements of cross-prudence and prudence. These local measures of prudence are essentially identical to the measure proposed by Kimball (1990) . It is well known that, for the single-risk case, DARA is equivalent to the utility function u 0 (:) being more concave than u(:) (see for example, Gollier, 2001 ).
Proposition 5.1 is an extension of this result to bivariate risks under a PQD background risk.
An interpretation of the sign of u 112 is provided by Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) , who showed that u 112 > 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for "cross-prudence in its second argument", meaning that a higher level of second argument mitigates the detrimental e¤ect of the monetary risk.
There are economic situations where negative dependence is more pertinent. Ifx andỹ are NQD, thenx and ỹ are PQD. We can de…ne m(x; y) = u(x; y), and Propositions 3.3, 4.1 and 5.1 can be applied to m(x; y) directly.
Comparative risk aversion in the presence of a …nancial background risk
Financial background risk has received much attention in the economics literature. For additive …nancial background risk, we refer to Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a ,b, 1986 ), Kischka (1988 , Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) , Eeckhoudt and Gollier, (2000) , Schlesinger (2000) , Gollier (2001) , Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) and Franke et al. (2011) . For multiplicative …nancial background risk, see Franke et al. (2006 Franke et al. ( , 2011 . In this section, we consider some examples to illustrate the use of Propositions 4.1 and 5.1 in the framework of additive or multiplicative background risks.
Additive background risk
First, we show that Proposition 4.1 allows us to extend the results of Ross (1981) for an additive background risk. Note that, for an additive background riskỹ, we have u(w; y) = U (w + y)
and v(w; y) = V (w + y):
Here w can be interpreted as the random wealth of an agent and y as a random increment to wealth, i.e., random income or …nancial portfolio.
Given that
Ross (1981) proposed the following results.
Proposition 6.1 (Ross (1981, Theorem 3)) For u(w; y) = U (w + y), v(w; y) = V (w + y) with U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
f or all w ; y and y 0 :
(ii) u v for 8 w, any zero-mean riskx andỹ with E[xjỹ = y] = Ex = 0. U 000 (w + y) U 00 (w + y)
We now show that Propositions 4.1 and 5.1 generalize Ross'conditions.
Conditions (7) and (8) imply
Proposition 4.1, (20), (21) and (24) immediately entail the following result.
Corollary 6.3 For u(w; y) = U (w + y), v(w; y) = V (w + y) with U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(ii) u v for 8 w and P QD(x;ỹ).
U 000 (w + y) U 00 (w + y)
From Proposition 5.1, (20), (21) and (26), we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 6.4 For u(w; y) = U (w + y), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and U 000 > 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) the partial risk premium associated with any P QD(x;ỹ) is decreasing in wealth.
(ii) 9 > 0, for all w, y and y 0 , U 000 (w + y) U 00 (w + y)
In Corollary 6.4, the condition for decreasing risk premia under PQD risks is equivalent to that for a …rst-order stochastic dominance (FSD) improvement in an independent background risk to decrease the risk premium, as shown by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) .
Multiplicative background risk
For a multiplicative background riskỹ, we have u(w; y) = U (wy)
and v(w; y) = V (wy):
Here w may represent the random wealth invested in a risky asset and y may represent a multiplicative random shock on random wealth, like a variation of random interest rate.
Because u 1 = yU 0 ; u 11 = y 2 U 00 ; u 12 = U 0 + wyU 00 ; u 111 = y 3 U 000 and u 112 = 2yU 00 + wy 2 U 000 (30) and v 1 = yV 0 ; v 11 = y 2 V 00 ; v 12 = V 0 + wyV 00 ; v 111 = y 3 V 000 and v 112 = 2yV 00 + wy 2 V 000 :
Conditions (7) and (8) imply, 9 1 ; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y 0 , U 0 (wy) + wyU 00 (wy) V 0 (wy) + wyV 00 (wy)
and U 00 (wy) V 00 (wy)
Then, from Proposition 4.1, (53), (54), (57) and (33), we obtain Corollary 6.5 For u(w; y) = U (wy), v(w; y) = V (wy) with U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) 9 1 ; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y 0 , U 0 (wy) + wyU 00 (wy) V 0 (wy) + wyV 00 (wy)
Because
U 0 (wy) + wyU 00 (wy) V 0 (wy) + wyV 00 (wy)
= U 00 (wy)(
U 00 (wy) + wy) V 00 (wy)( V 0 (wy) are indices of absolute risk aversion. We can obtain a more concise su¢ cient condition from Corollary 6.5. Corollary 6.6 For u(w; y) = U (wy), v(w; y) = V (wy) with w > 0,ỹ > 0 almost surely, U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, If 9 > 0, for all w,y and y 0 , U 00 (wy) V 00 (wy)
then u v for 8 w and P QD(x;ỹ).
Proof From Corollary 6.5 and (36), we know that for all w,y and y 0 , U 00 (wy) V 00 (wy)
and RA U (wy) RA V (wy) imply that u v for 8 w and P QD(x;ỹ). Using the fact that "U is more Ross risk averse than V ) RA U (wy) RA V (wy)", we obtain the result. Q.E.D.
Corollary 6.6 states that "more Ross risk aversion" is a su¢ cient condition to order the partial risk premium in the presence of PQD multiplicative background risk.
From Proposition 5.1, we obtain
Corollary 6.7 For u(w; y) = U (wy), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and U 000 > 0, the partial risk premium associated with any P QD(x;ỹ) is decreasing in wealth if and only if, 9 1 ; 2 > 0, for all w,y and y 0 , 2yU 00 (wy) + wy 2 U 000 (wy) U 0 (wy) + wyU 00 (wy)
and yU 000 (wy) U 00 (wy)
Because 2yU 00 (wy) + wy 2 U 000 (wy) U 0 (wy) + wyU 00 (wy)
= yU 000 (wy)(2 U 00 (wy)
U 000 (wy) + wy) U 00 (wy)( U 0 (wy) U 00 (wy) + wy) = yU 000 (wy)(wy 2 1 P U (wy) ) U 00 (wy)(wy
where P U (wy) = U 000 (wy) U 00 (wy) is the index of absolute prudence. We can obtain a shorter su¢ cient condition from Corollary 6.7 and (41).
Corollary 6.8 For u(w; y) = U (wy), with w > 0,ỹ > 0 almost surely, U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and U 000 > 0, The partial risk premium associated with P QD(x;ỹ) is decreasing in wealth if , 9 > 0, for all w, y and y 0 , yU 000 (wy) U 00 (wy)
and P U (wy) 2RA U (wy).
Moreover, (42) can be multiplied by w on both sides to obtain the results in terms of measures of relative risk aversion and relative prudence:
wyU 000 (wy) U 00 (wy)
which implies "min relative prudence max relative risk aversion". Whereas in the literature, P U 2RA U is an important condition for risk vulnerability (see Gollier 2001, p129) , Corollary 6.8 shows that P U 2RA U is also an important condition for comparative risk aversion in the presence of a PQD multiplicative background risk.
Decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and n-switch independence property
Because the conditions derived in Ross (1981) are fairly restrictive upon preference, some readers may regard Ross'results as negative, because no standard utility functions (logarithmic, power, mixture of exponentials) satisfy these conditions. Pratt (1990) suggests that probability distribution restrictions stronger than mean independence may provide more satisfactory comparative statics. In a very di¤erent domain, Bell (1988) proposes that agents are likely to be characterized by a utility function satisfying the one-switch rule: there exists at most one critical wealth level at which the decision-maker switches from preferring one alternative to the other. He shows that the linex function (linear plus exponential) is the only relevant utility function family if one adds to the one-switch rule some very reasonable requirements. This utility function has been studied by Bell and Fishburn (2001) , Sandvik and Thorlund-Petersen (2010) , Abbas and Bell (2011) and Winkler (2009, 2012) . In a recent paper, Denuit et al. (2011b) show that Ross'stronger measure of risk aversion gives rise to the linex utility function and therefore they provide not only a utility function family but also some intuitive and convenient properties for Ross'measure. Abbas and Bell (2011) extend the one-switch independence property to two-attribute utility functions, and propose a new independence assumption based on the one-switch property: nswitch independence (see Tsetlin and Winkler, 2012 , for a similar extension).
De…nition (Abbas and Bell 2011) For utility function u(x; y), X is n-switch independent of Y if two gamblesx 1 andx 2 can switch in preference at most n times as Y progresses from its lowest to its highest value.
They provide the following propositions:
Proposition 7.1 (Abbas and Bell 2011) X is one-switch independent of Y if and only if
where g 1 (y) has a constant sign, and g 2 (y) = g 1 (y) (y) for some monotonic function .
Proposition 7.2 (Abbas and Bell 2011) If X is n-switch independent of Y , then there exist some functions f i , g i such that
We now show that the one-switch property of Proposition 7.1 is a consequence of Proposition 5.1. We also argue that (45) is a utility function that satis…es the decreasing cross Ross risk aversion condition proposed in Section 3.
From Proposition 5.1 we know that the partial risk premium u , associated with any P QD(x;ỹ) is decreasing in wealth, if and only if there exists : R R ! R with 1 0, 12 0 and 11 0, and > 0 such that
Solving the above di¤erential equation implies that u is of the form
If we take (x; y) = H(x)J(y) such that J(y) has a constant sign, then we get
De…ning g 1 (y) = g 2 (y) = 1 J(y), f 1 (x) = H(x) and f 2 (x) = R x 1 e t H 0 (t)dte x , we recognize the functional form in Proposition 7.1.
Integrating the integral term of (48) by parts again and again, we obtain
where f i (x) = ( 1) (i 1) H (i 1) (x) for i = 1; :::; n, f n+1 (x) = R x 1 e t ( 1) n H (n) (t)dte x , g i (y) = 1 i J(y) for i = 1; ::; n and g n+1 (y) = 1 n J(y). Therefore we obtain the functional form in Proposition 7.2 from decreasing cross Ross risk aversion. Although coming from very di¤erent approaches, decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and n-switch independence reach the same functional form. Our result thus provides a connection between decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and n-switch independence.
In this paper we consider expected-utility preferences in a bivariate setting. The analysis focuses on PQD random variables. The main contribution is to propose a risk premium for removing one of the risks in the presence of a second dependent risk. To this end, we extend Ross' (1981) contribution by de…ning the concept of "cross Ross risk aversion." We derive several equivalence theorems relating measures of risk premia with measures of risk aversion. We then consider additive risks and multiplicative risks as two special cases. We also show that the decreasing cross Ross risk aversion assumption about behavior gives rise to the utility function family that belongs to the class of n-switch utility functions. The analysis and the index of risk aversion in this paper may be instrumental in obtaining comparative static predictions in various applications.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2.3
It is obvious that
is non-decreasing in x. We now consider PQD(x;ỹ). Cohen et al. (1994) introduce the concept of conditionally increasing in sequence:
De…nition 9.1 (Cohen et al. 1994) The random variables (ỹ;x) are said to be conditionally increasing in sequence (CIS) if
for x x .
We know that E[ỹjx = x] non-decreasing in x implies that (ỹ;x) are CIS. From the theorems in Cohen et al. (1994, Theorem 2.5) and Joe (1997, Theorem 2.3 (b) ), we obtain
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
We will use following notations:
@x@y dxdy.
(ii) implies (i): First, we have
where H(x; y) = F X (x)F Y (y). From Levy (1974, corollary 4) , we know that
]dxdy 0 (because u 12 0 and P QD(x;ỹ)):
From the above manipulations, we obtain that Eu(w +x;ỹ) Eu(w + Ex;ỹ). is PQD with the joint distribution function G(z; y) 3 . Using Taylor expansion of Eu(w 0 + kz;ỹ) around w 0 , this yields, for any k:
Because
= EzEu 1 (w 0 ;ỹ) + Cov(z; u 1 (w 0 ;ỹ))
Then, from (54) we know that, when k ! 0, we get Eu(w 0 +x;ỹ) > Eu(w 0 ;ỹ) for G(z; y) such
n 2 ] and zero elsewhere. This is a contradiction.
Suppose u 11 (w; y) > 0 for some w and y. Because u 11 is continuous, we have
Let us consider w 0 2 [m 0 1 ; m 0 2 ] andx = kz, wherez is a zero-mean risk and (z;ỹ) are independent. Using Taylor expansion of Eu(w 0 + kz;ỹ) around w 0 . For any k, this yields
Then, from (57) we know that, when k ! 0, we get Eu(w 0 +x;ỹ) > Eu(w 0 ;ỹ) for F (x; y) such that F Y (y) has positive support on interval [n 0 1 ; n 0 2 ]. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1
We note that
u 11 (w; y) v 11 (w; y) (ii) implies (iii): From Proposition 3.3, we know that 11 0, 12 0 and (x;ỹ) is PQD(x;ỹ)
, E (w +x;ỹ) E (w;ỹ). We also know that 1 0 ) (w; y) (w v ; y). The following proof is as in Ross:
= E[ v(w +x;ỹ) + (w +x;ỹ)] = Ev(w v ;ỹ) + E (w +x;ỹ) 
which can be written as
Let us consider w 0 2 [m 1 ; m 2 ] andx = kz with k > 0, wherez is a zero-mean risk and (z;ỹ) is PQD with a distribution function G(z; y). Let u (k) denote its associated partial risk premium, which is
Di¤erentiating the equality above with respect to k yields
Observing that u (0) = 0, we get 
Then, from (66) we know that, when k ! 0, we get u < v for F (x; y) and G(z; y) such that 
and Eu 11 (w;ỹ) Eu 1 (w;ỹ) < Ev 11 (w;ỹ) Ev 1 (w;ỹ) :
Let us consider w 0 2 [m 0 1 ; m 0 2 ] andx = kz, wherez is a zero-mean risk andz andỹ are independent. Let u (k) denote its associated partial risk premium, which is de…ned by Eu(w 0 + kz;ỹ) = Eu(w 0 u (k);ỹ):
Di¤erentiating the above equality with respect to k yields 
Similarly, for v we have 
Now u and v can be written in the form of Taylor expansions around k = 0:
Eu 11 (w 0 ;ỹ) Eu 1 (w 0 ;ỹ)
and v (k) = Ev 11 (w 0 ;ỹ) Ev 1 (w 0 ;ỹ)
Then, from (77) we know that, when k ! 0, we get u < v for F (x; y) such that F Y (y) has positive support on interval [n 0 1 ; n 0 2 ]. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
